Jury Memory? (Schemata)  (Reisberg, Applied, Ch. 7)

Chapter 7 of the textbook covers many topics directly relevant to the question of what eyewitnesses to crimes can or cannot remember. But memory is also relevant to the courts for another reason: Members of a jury must sit and listen to hours (and sometimes many days) of courtroom testimony. Then they move into the jury room, where, on the basis of their recollection of the testimony, they must evaluate the facts of the case and reach a verdict. But what if the jurors don't remember the testimony they have heard? In some jurisdictions, members of the jury are allowed to take notes during the trial, but in many jurisdictions they are not. Perhaps we should worry, therefore, about jurors' memories just as much as we worry about witnesses' memories.

Jurors' memories are, of course, influenced by the same factors as any other memories. For example, we know, in general, that people try to fit complex events into a mental framework, or schema. Aspects of the event that fit well with this schema are likely to be remembered. Aspects that do not fit with the schema may be forgotten, or remembered in a distorted form, so that the now-distorted recollection does fit with the schema. This pattern has been documented in many settings, and so it's not surprising that it can also be demonstrated in jurors.

In the opening phase of a trial, lawyers from each side present their own "story" about how the contested events actually unfolded. Jurors are supposed to give equal weight to both "stories," the one offered by the prosecutor (or the lawyers for the plaintiff) and the one offered by the defense. In actuality, though, jury members often prefer one of these stories right from the start, and they then try to understand the trial evidence by thinking about how it fits into that story.

In a way, these "stories" about the case are helpful: It turns out that jurors remember more of the trial evidence if they have a story in mind from the trial's start. That's because they can fit the facts into the framework provided by the story as each new bit of evidence arrives. Likewise, jurors will remember more of the trial evidence if we make it easier for them to fit the evidence into a story. Concretely, they'll remember more if the trial evidence is presented in "story sequence"-first the earliest events in the story, then later events, and so on.

But there's also a downside: Once jurors have adopted a story about the trial, evidence that's consistent with the story is more likely to be remembered; evidence inconsistent with the story is often forgotten. In addition, jurors can sometimes "remember" evidence that actually wasn't presented during the trial, but which is consistent with the story!

These findings are just what we'd expect, based on what we know about memory in other settings. But these facts are also troubling, because we would obviously prefer that jurors remember all the evidence, and remember it accurately. Perhaps, therefore, we should seek changes in courtroom procedures, or changes in juror strategy, so that, in the end, the jurors' verdict will be based on an unbiased and complete recollection of the trial evidence.

To learn more about this topic in cognitive psychology and the law:

See, in the textbook chapter, pages 220-222

* Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: Tests of the story model for juror decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 189-206.

* Pritchard, M., & Keenan, J. (2002). Does jury deliberation really improve jurors' memories? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 589-601.

Huntley, J. & Costanzo, M. (2003). Sexual harassment stories: Testing a story-mediated model of juror decision making in civil litigation. Law and Human Behavior, 27, 29-51.